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excessive, and (2) the Agreement does not provide any basis for
awarding attorney's fees to Golwix.

The authorities relied

upon by Stacey reinforce the conclusion that the trial court's
measure of damages did not compensate Golwix for Stacey7s
breaches of the Agreement.

Moreover, the unequivocal terms of

the Agreement provide for an award of attorney's fees incurred
by Golwix in successfully enforcing its claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FAILED TO PLACE
GOLWIX PROPERTIES IN AS GOOD A POSITION AS IF THE CONTRACT
HAD BEEN PERFORMED.
The first issue raised by Golwix' cross appeal is

whether the trial court applied the correct measure of damages.
Stacey does not dispute the legal standard set forth in
Golwix's initial brief that recoverable damages include "those
which arise naturally from the breach and which reasonably may
be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the
parties or are reasonably foreseeable."

Robbins v. Finley, 645

P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982); see Cross Appellants' Brief at 28.
Stacey cites with approval the case of Alexander v. Brown, 646
P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), in which this Court stated the general
rule regarding the correct measure of damages:

"Damages are

properly measured by the amount necessary to place the
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract
would have been performed."

Id. at 695.
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The only point of disagreement among the parties to
this appeal therefore appears to be whether the trial court
properly applied the foregoing measure of damages. As set
forth in Golwix,s initial brief, the fractional awards granted
by the trial court with respect to the air conditioner and the
post office roof failed to place Golwix in as good a position
as if the contract had been performed.

The awards excluded

substantial actual damages that were reasonably foreseeable and
within the contemplation of the parties at the time they
entered into the Agreement.
Stacey avoids addressing Golwix,s arguments directly in
its opposing brief.

Instead, Stacey now raises, for the first

time, a totally new position —
awards were excessive.

that the trial court's damage

The arguments supporting Stacey's

belated excessiveness position are threefold.

First, Stacey

argues that certain "as is" language contained in the Agreement
should be construed to limit the express warranty concerning
the air-conditioning unit and the clear covenants to maintain
watertight the Ogden post office roof.

Second, Stacey attempts

to challenge the trial court's factual findings concerning
Stacey's breach of warranty concerning the air-conditioning
unit.

Third, Stacey challenges the trial court's factual

findings that it breached its covenent to maintain the post
office roof.

As will be demonstrated below, each of these

arguments is entirely without merit.

3

A.

The "As Is" Language in the Agreement Does Not Limit
Express Warranties and Covenants,
From the beginning in this case, Stacey has

attempted to justify its breaches of warranty and contract by
relying on language contained in paragraph 1 of the Agreement
which provides:

"The properties have been inspected by

[Golwix] and are purchased 'as is 7 ." Stacey's arguments
concerning that language were correctly rejected by the trial
court as having no effect upon the express warranties and
covenants contained in the Agreement.

Stacey's renewed attempt

to hide behind this language should not be permitted by this
Court.
The law is clear that the phrase "as is" does not
limit in any way other express provisions contained in the same
agreement.

In Tibbetts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d

160 (1967), this Court recognized, by analogy to the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"), that words creating an express
warranty and words limiting warranties should be construed as
consistent with each other.
70-A-2-316(l) (1980).

See id. at 162; Utah Code Ann. §

Under the UCC, all "implied warranties

are excluded by expressions like 'as is7 . . . ." Utah Code
Ann. § 70-A-2-316(3)(a) (1980).

Because the Agreement in this

case contains express warranties and covenants as well as the
"as is" language, the only logical and consistent construction
is that the parties intended to exclude implied warranties of
quality and provide other express warranties and covenants.

4

See, e.g.. Tenwick v. Bvrd, 9 Ark. App. 340, 659 S.W. 2d 950
(1983); Society National Bank v. Remberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26,
409 N.E. 2d 1073 (1979); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code § 12-3 (2d ed. 1980).
In the Agreement, Stacey made the following express
warranty:

"We represent and warrant to you that all heating,

cooling, electrical, plumbing, and sewer systems at the
property are in working order and will be operative at
closing."
added.))

(Findings and Conclusions para. 8, R-498 (emphasis
Moreover, Stacey expressly agreed to "perform all

necessary repairs to the roof of the post office building which
are reasonably required to maintain a watertight roof surface
for a period of 67 months from the date of closing . . . ."
(Id.)

These express warranties and covenants were a

significant inducement to the transaction and can in no way be
diminished by the disclaimer of implied warranties contained in
the Agreement.
B.

Golwix was Entitled, at Least, to an Award of Damages
Equal to the Cost of Putting the Air-Conditioning Unit
in Working Order.
The uncontroverted evidence at trial demonstrated

that Golwix was forced to incur the actual cost of $22,758 to
replace an air-conditioning unit that could not have been made
operative without incurring a repair cost of $19,000 to
$20,000.

(Findings and Conclusions para. ll.a(5), R-499;

TR-211-12; TR-215.)

Of course, Golwix selected the only

economically reasonable path and replaced the unit for slightly
5

more than the necessary repair cost.

Stacey presented

absolutely no evidence at trial indicating that it had made any
efforts to repair the unit after receiving notice that the unit
was not operative.

Moreover, Stacey presented no evidence

concerning repair or replacement cost.

Nevertheless, Stacey

now argues that the trial court's factual findings concerning
the condition

of the unit were incorrect.

Stacey7s argument

ignores the substantial burden necessary to overcome the trial
court's express factual findings and urges an untenable
construction of the express warranty.
In Lemon v. Coatesf 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (March 27,
1987), this Court recently recognized the superior position of
the trial court in making factual findings:
It was the function of the Judge,
acting as the trier of fact, to decide
which evidence was more credible on
this issue. We may not disturb the
Judge's findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a). Plaintiff has not met this
burden.
Id. (emphasis added.)

Similarly, in Shioii v. Shioiif 712 P.2d

197 (Utah 1985) , this court noted that,
on appeal from a judgment of the trial
court, our role is not to substitute
our own findings for those of the trial
court, but to examine the record for
evidence supporting the judgment.
Id. at 201.
In the face of the clearly erroneous standard of
review for factual findings, Stacey makes the same argument
that it did to the trial court.
6

Stacey argues that the

evidence at trial indicated that the air-conditioning unit was
operative on May 22, 1984. Stacey makes a further evidentiary
argument concerning an unsuccessful repair attempted by Golwix
shortly after the closing date, which resulted in an
expenditure of $1,030.34. Indeed, Stacey goes so far as to
argue that Golwix's damage award should be limited to that
expenditure.

The evidence concerning these fact issues,

however, was ruled upon by the trial court against Stacey.
Stacey has not and cannot meet the heavy burden of
demonstrating that the trial court's findings were clearly
erroneous.
The trial court made the following findings:
(1) The air-conditioning unit,
according to the circumstantial
evidence presented, was not in working
order and was not operative on May 22,
1984;

(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene
Perrin of the post office by at least
May 29, 1984 that the air-conditioning
unit was not operable. Plaintiff and
J. Ron Stacey failed to make repairs to
the unit after receiving notice from
the post office that the unit was
inoperable;
(5) Defendants incurred a total
expense of $22,758.00 to replace the
air-conditioning unit, the first
installment of which in the amount of
$6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984.
(Findings and Conclusions para. 11.a., R-499.)

These findings

are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
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Mr. Eugene Perrin, the Ogden post office
maintenance supervisor, testified that prior to May 22, 1984 he
contacted Stacey to check the units before turning the
air-conditioning on for the summer season.

(TR-109-10.)

Mr.

Perrin started the unit on a weekend and on Tuesday, May 29,
1984 (apparently after the long Memorial Day weekend) Mr.
Perrin noticed that the unit was not operating.
TR-557-59.)

(TR-111-12;

Mr. Arthur Smith, another post office maintenance

employee, testified that he was "positive" that the air
conditioner had not "worked at all" before Stacey was notified
that the unit was inoperable.

(TR-154.)

Stacey presented

absolutely no evidence that the air conditioner was in working
order and operative on May 22, 1984.
Mr. Perrin telephoned Stacey on May 29, 1984 to
report the failure and sent a follow up letter requesting
repairs.

(TR-111, 113-14; Exhibit D-3.)

Stacey did not

investigate the failure and offered no repairs.
TR-155; Exhibit D-4.)

(TR-63-64;

The evidence further indicated that

Golwix requested the Holbrook Company to repair the unit
shortly after the property purchase.

(TR-171.)

Because

repeated leaks in the condensor coil over the years had
resulted in serious damage to the compressor unit and other
parts of the system, those repairs were unsuccessful.
(TR-208-210).1

The leaks in the coil were caused by a design

1

The fact that the repairs were unsuccessful is further
supported by Arthur Smith's testimony:
8

defect which had caused the coil to leak repeatedly over the
years resulting in the ultimate demise of the unit.
224-25.)

(TR-210,

Golwix reasonably followed the advice of the

air-conditioning experts and replaced the unit due to the fact
that the repair cost would nearly equal the cost of a new unit.
(TR-211-12.)

The substantial evidence presented by Golwix on

this issue led the trial court to the only reasonable
conclusion that the unit was not in working order and operative
at the date of closing.
Unable to challenge the evidence, Stacey now argues
that the language of the warranty concerning the
air-conditioning unit was limited to a single day.

Incredibly,

Stacey contends that it "did not warrant the operability or
condition of the air-conditioning units for one day beyond the

Q.

Did the Air Conditioner work after Holbrook did
whatever they did?

A.

I don't recall it ever working

Q.

Were you at the Post Office during the entire
summer of 1984?

....

A. Yes.
Q.

Do you recall the east air conditioner unit working
at any time during that summer?

A.

I don't — the next time I recall the air
conditioner working is when they put the new one
in. I believe that was sometime in August.

(TR-157.)

9

date of closing, May 22, 1984."
8.

Brief of Cross Respondents at

Such a narrow construction of the language of the Agreement

is unreasonable and was properly rejected by the trial court.
By the express language of the Agreement, Stacey represented
and warranted that the cooling system was "in working order and
will be operative at closing."

There is nothing in that

language limiting the duration of the warranty to one single
day.

The phrase "will be operative at closing" does not limit

the duration of the warranty but merely places a deadline on
Stacey to perform needed maintenance and repairs. That
construction is reinforced by the use of the term "working
order", which does not refer to the date of closing.

The term

"working order" plainly suggests a cooling system that was ~
functioning properly at the time the representation and
warranty was made and that would continue to provide
satisfactory cooling for a reasonable period of time.
Stacey contends that Golwix had a duty to inspect
the air-conditioning unit to determine its probable life. The
representation and warranty that the cooling system was in
working order and would be operative, however, relieved Golwix
of any duty of inspection.
29.

See Brief of Cross Appellants at

Moreover, cross respondent J. Ron Stacey admitted at trial

that an identical companion air-conditioning unit at the Ogden
post office had failed the year before, requiring replacement
of the coil at a cost in excess of $9,000.

(TR-61-62.)

That

fact was exclusively within the knowledge of Stacey and was not
10

disclosed to Golwix.

(Id.)

If any party had a duty, Mr.

Stacey, who is an experienced contractor (TR-49), had the duty
to disclose to Golwix the precarious condition of the
air-conditioning unit.

Stacey should not now be heard to argue

that Golwix had a duty to inspect the unit in light of the
express representation and warranty and Mr. Stacey's personal
knowledge of the defects that caused the failure.
The only error of the trial court concerning the
air-conditioning unit was its failure to fully compensate
Golwix for its actual loss.

This Court has observed that:

The determination of the trial court on
damages will not be reversed if it is
supported by substantial evidence in
the record. We will, however, reverse
a trial court if there is a
misapplication of the law to the
established facts.
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982).

The

trial court's findings that Golwix incurred the actual cost of
$22,758 to replace an air-conditioning unit that was not in
working order and was not operative at the date of closing was
supported by substantial evidence.

The trial court, however,

misapplied the law to those established facts. An award of a
percentage of the damages failed to put Golwix in the position
of having an air-conditioning unit that was in working order
and operative.

The only way the warranted result could be

achieved was by repairing the unit at substantial cost or
replacing the unit for a nearly equal cost.

This Court should

therefore remand the case for entry of an award of damages
11

equal to the cost of replacing the unit, or at the very least,
the cost of the necessary repairs.
C.

Stacey Failed to Honor its Covenant to Repair and
Maintain the Post Office Roof for the Entire
Contract Term.
As Stacey points out in its opposing brief, Judge

Roth agreed with the evidence and concluded that the Ogden post
office roof needed replacement in order for the roof to be
watertight.

See Brief of Cross Respondents at 12-13.

As owner

of the post office building and as the contractor who had
constructed the building initially (TR-50), Stacey was well
aware of the roof's condition.

It is entirely foreseeable and

within the contemplation of the parties that the roof could
completely fail during the contract term.2

As set forth in

Golwix's opening brief, the evidence presented at trial (with
which Judge Roth concededly agreed) indicated that the roof had
indeed completely failed, but Stacey had not maintained the
roof in a watertight condition and could not do so for the
remainder of the contract term.

Therefore, the only award that

could have placed Golwix in the same position as if the
contract were performed was an award of damages sufficient to
enable Golwix to put the roof in a watertight condition.

2

The

Notably, Stacey did not raise, at trial, the
affirmative defenses of mistake, impossibility, or frustration
of purpose on which it now appears to rely and upon which the
trial court appears to have based its judgment.
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only evidence presented at trial on this issue indicated that
the replacement cost for a comparable roof was $43,750.3
Stacey argues that the trial court's award of a
percentage of the actual damages should be reduced even further
to provide a credit for repairs that Stacey made during the
initial months of the warranty period.

That argument is wholly

without merit and completely ignores the trial court's factual
findings.

Based on the substantial evidence presented, the

trial court found that:
The Ogden post office roof has leaked
on numerous occasions following closing
and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have
failed to perform all necessary repairs
which were reasonably required to
maintain a watertight roof surface;
(Findings and Conclusions para. 11.c.)

Indeed, the evidence

indicated that the roof had leaked incessantly since the date
Golwix purchased the property and that it would continue to do
so throughout the remainder of the contract term.

(TR-120-29,

159-60, 279-80, 284-94, Exhibit D-23.)
The minimal efforts taken by Stacey during the
initial portion of the contract period were unsuccessful.
J

Stacey contends that Golwix is manipulating, on appeal,
the evidence on this point to its advantage for purposes of
this appeal. See Brief of Cross Respondents at 14 n.3. As the
record indicates, however, Golwix7s claim at trial was for an
award of $43,750. (Findings and Conclusions para. 9(c),
R-498.) If the trial court's measure of damages is upheld by
this Court, the amount claimed by Golwix should be used in the
calculation. See Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellants at
33-34.
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Moreover, the evidence indicated that the prior leaks had
resulted in numerous problems and damages to Golwix.

Based on

the sustantial evidence presented, Judge Roth found that Stacey
had breached the covenant for the entire contract period prior
to trial.

Consequently, there is no factual basis for giving

Stacey a credit for whatever unsuccessful repairs may have been
performed.
The contractual agreement to repair and maintain
the roof was an essential part of the real estate transaction.
Golwix's cash flow projections and economic evaluations, upon
which it based its purchase decision, assumed that the building
would be free of expenses related to roof problems during that
period.

(TR-431-32.)

By awarding Golwix only a percentage of

the cost of a new roof, the trial court's award did not put
Golwix in the same position as if the contract had been fully
performed.4

The only award that could do so would be an award

of the cost of replacing the roof.
II.

THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO GOLWIX PROPERTIES.
Stacey does not and cannot argue that Golwix was not

the prevailing party with respect to a substantial number of
its counterclaims at trial.

Instead, Stacey argues that

4

In fact, the award placed Golwix in a worse position.
Stacey was relieved of all obligations regarding the roof,
leaving Golwix with the need to make enormous capital
expenditure to place the roof in watertight condition.

14

Section 17 of the Agreement fails to provide any basis for an
award of attorney's fees.

Stacey carefully avoids, however,

citing the language of the Agreement.
In paragraph 17, Stacey specifically agreed to
"indemnify, defend, and hold [Golwix] harmless and reimburse
[Golwix] on demand" for "reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses, and costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in
investigating, preparing, or defending against any litigation
or claim . . • relating or attributable to" among other things
"the enforcement of [Golwix's] rights under this Agreement."
That language is plain and understandable.

Stacey agreed to

indemnify and reimburse Golwix for attorney's fees and costs
incurred in enforcing its rights under the Agreement.

Stacey

argues that because Section 17 is labeled "indemnity" that it
is limited only to claims asserted by third parties. That
argument ignores the express language of the Agreement.

If the

parties had intended to limit the scope of Section 17 to claims
asserted by third parties, they certainly could have stated
that intention.

To the contrary, the parties expressly agreed

that Stacey would indemnify and reimburse Golwix for attorney's
fees incurred in "any litigation" in which Golwix enforces its
rights under the Agreement.
Finally, Stacey argues that if Section 17 applies,
Golwix is entitled only to attorney's fees incurred in
enforcing its breach of contract claims and not its offset
claims asserted under the promissory note.
15

Such a distinction

is false and without any basis.

All of Golwix's counterclaims

in this action are based upon breaches of Stacey's warranties
and covenants contained in the Agreement.

Simply because

Golwix chose to exercise its offset rights against the
promissory note in no way diminishes or alters the source of
its claims.
In Trainer v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), a case
relied upon by Stacey, this Court held that, "Where the parties
have agreed by contract to the payment of attorney's fees, the
court may award reasonable fees in accordance with the terms of
the parties' agreement."

Id. at 858.

Stacey agreed to pay

Golwix's attorney's fees incurred in enforcing its rights under
the Agreement and Golwix is entitled to such an award.

The

case should be remanded to permit Golwix to present evidence
concerning the attorney's fees it incurred in vindicating its
rights under the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in Golwix's opening
brief, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
remanded with directions (1) to enter an award of damages to
place Golwix in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed with respect to the air-conditioning unit and the
post office roof, and (2) to award Golwix its attorney's fees
incurred in enforcing its rights under the Agreement.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

sfcday of June, 1987.

KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

Ronald/G. Russell
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 1st day of June, 1987 four
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS
APPELLANTS were hand-delivered to:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
William P. Schwartz, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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